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SPECULATIVE AND HEDGING INTERACTION MODEL
IN OIL AND U.S. DOLLAR MARKETS:
NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR ONE OR MORE BANKS
DAVID CARFÌ a∗ AND MICHAEL CAMPBELL b
ABSTRACT. We determine the (refined) Nash equilibria for a bounded rational Carfì-
Musolino speculative and hedging model. This model shows two types of operators: a real
economic subject (Air) and one or more investment banks (Bank). We consider the bank
agents’ behavior to equilibrate much more quickly than that of Air, as they react to the
move of Air. In this sense, Air is an acting external agent, whereas the action of the banks is
‘annealed’ – i.e., equilibrates before Air makes its next transaction. When Air makes no
purchases of oil futures as a hedge, two Nash equilibria exist for the bank agents. However,
a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the bank agents when Air makes a purchase. This is a
result of Air’s purchase breaking a symmetry of the potential. The existence of multiple
equilibriums in this two-market model is in the spirit of the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu
theorem, and is associated with phase transitions in statistical mechanics.
1. Introduction
A bounded rational Carfì-Musolino speculative and hedging model involving market
transactions among a real economic subject (“Air”) and a finite number of investment
players (“Banks”) was studied by Carfì and Campbell (2015). There it was shown that the
model is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley 1996) and that the Gibbs measure from
statistical mechanics is the bounded rational equilibrium for Air and any finite number of
Bank subjects reacting to the transaction of Air.
For potential games, the maximum of the potential is considered to be an appropriate
refinement of the Nash equilibrium (Carbonell-Nicolau and McLean 2014). The potential
turns out to have a symmetry when Air does not make any purchases of oil futures as a hedge.
This symmetry results in two maximums for the potential – i.e., two equilibriums. The
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Sonnenschein 1972, 1973; Debreu 1974; Mantel
1974) implies that a unique equilibrium may not exist for multiple markets that interact with
each other. This is indeed the case here. It is also seen that when Air makes a purchase, the
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symmetry of the potential is broken. This results in a unique maximum, and hence a unique
equilibrium exists in this case.
1.1. Literature review. In this paper, we shall refer to a wide variety of literature. First
of all, we shall consider some papers on the complete study of differentiable games and
related mathematical backgrounds, introduced and applied to economic theories since 2008
by Carfì and coworkers (Carfì 2008, 2009; Carfì and Ricciardello 2009, 2010; Agreste et al.
2012; Baglieri et al. 2012; Carfì and Ricciardello 2012a,b; Carfì and Schilirò 2012a,b,c;
Carfì and Ricciardello 2013).
Specific applications of the previous methodologies, also strictly related to the present
model, have been illustrated by Carfì and Musolino (2012a,b, 2013a,b,c, 2014a,b, 2015a,b).
Other important applications of the complete examination methodology were introduced
by Agreste et al. (2012), Baglieri et al. (2012), Carfì and Ricciardello (2012a,b), Carfì and
Schilirò (2012a,b,c), Carfì and Ricciardello (2013), and Carfì and Campbell (2015).
For other physics and economic bases we shall refer to Sonnenschein (1972, 1973),
Debreu (1974), Mantel (1974), Beightler and Wilde (1996), Monderer and Shapley (1996),
Campbell (2005), and Carbonell-Nicolau and McLean (2014).
In this section, for convenience of the reader, we reconsider the game model analyzed by
Carfì and Campbell (2015), without significant changes.
1.2. Preliminary survey of the model. As discussed by Carfì and Musolino (2014b)
and Carfì and Campbell (2015), we consider a game with a finite number N of “Bank”
(investment) players, and all of these players belong to the set Λ. At any moment in time, a
Bank player i ∈ Λ can select an action or strategy
(y(i)1 ,y
(i)
2 ) ∈ F
and the y(i)1 and y
(i)
2 are the strategy variables.
The strategy y(i)1 represents the proportion of its resources that Bank i spends on the oil
spot market, and y(i)2 represents the proportion of its resources spent on the (US) dollar
futures market from its total resources M > 0.
A configuration y⃗ of the system is any possible state of the system:
y⃗ =
(
(y(1)1 ,y
(1)
2 ),(y
(2)
1 ,y
(2)
2 ), . . . ,(y
(N)
1 ,y
(N)
2 )
)
, (1)
where each
(y(i)1 ,y
(i)
2 ) ∈ F .
The set of all possible configurations of the game is
ΦΛ :=∏
i∈Λ
F(i), (2)
which is called (pure) state space. The
F(i) := F
here is the diamond set
F :=
{⃗
y ∈ (R2)N : ∥(y(i)1 ,y(i)2 )∥1 =
⏐⏐⏐y(i)1 ⏐⏐⏐+ ⏐⏐⏐y(i)2 ⏐⏐⏐≤ 1} . (3)
Now we will define the payoff functions as done by Carfì and Musolino (2014b).
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The real economic subject (“Air”) is a player in the game, and is assigned zero as its
player number. Its strategy variable
x ∈ [0,1]
represents the proportion of its resources M(0) spent on purchasing oil futures as a hedge.
The remaining proportion of Air’s resources, 1− x, is spent purchasing jet fuel on the spot
market. The oil payoff function for Air is then what it spent: the amount of jet fuel it bought
on the spot market,
(1− x)M(0),
multiplied by its savings on the price of jet fuel (hedge prices minus the actual prices, which
depends on the actions of Bank and contains a negated 1 component related to what Bank
spent on US dollar futures).
In the case of only a single Bank (player 1), this reduces to (Carfì and Musolino 2014b)
f (0)O (x, y⃗) = M
(0)(1− x)(u(un−ν)y(1)1 +uky(1)2 ), (4)
where u is the capitalization factor (1+ r, for risk-free interest rate r) resulting from the
transaction occuring in the previous time step. The parameter
n > 0
represents the effect of Bank’s strategy y(1)1 on the oil spot market price at time 1, and
k > 0
is the negative influence of Bank’s strategy y(1)2 on the price of oil futures. Both n and k
depend on Bank’s ability to influence the oil spot market and the behavior of other financial
agents. A tax parameter ν , with
0≤ ν ≤ nu,
can be set within the range of no taxation (ν = 0) to full taxation (ν = un).
For the single Bank player, the Bank payoff function for dollar futures is the product of
the amount purchased, and returns per unit of dollar futures:
f (1)$ (x, y⃗) = y
(1)
2 M(−u2ny(1)1 +u(k−κ)y(1)2 −umx), (5)
where
k−κ = 0
in Carfì and Musolino (2014b) as a result of a tax, and there Bank gains nothing from its
actions on the oil spot market. Here, we can vary κ within
0≤ κ ≤ k
to represent the range from no taxation (κ = 0) to full taxation (κ = k). The parameter
m > 0
measures the influence of Air’s strategy x on the price of oil futures and the ability of Air to
influence the oil market and the behavior of other financial agents.
1It is pointed out by Carfì and Musolino (2014b), and references therein, that rises in oil prices are associated
with the depreciation of the US dollar. Hence there is a leading negative sign in front of y(1)1 in Eq. 5.
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Similarly, Bank’s payoff function from the oil spot market is the product of the amount
purchased and returns per unit:
f (1)O (x, y⃗) = y
(1)
1 M((un−ν)y(1)1 +uδy(1)2 ), (6)
where as above, the tax paramter ν is set so that
un−ν = 0
in Carfì and Musolino (2014b) as a result of a tax (we can take 0≤ ν ≤ un to represent the
range from full taxation to no taxation), and
m > 0
measures the influence of Air’s strategy x on the price of oil futures and the ability of Air to
influence the oil market and the behavior of other financial agents.
The model can be generalized to a single large-scale economic subject (Air player zero)
and many investors (Bank players each labeled i, 1≤ i≤ N). For simplicity, we assume the
Bank players are interaction homogeneous2 , so that they all have the same resources and
are identically affected by each other and by Air, within markets.
The gains of each Bank i from the dollar futures market would then be affected by
Air and all Bank players:
p$(x, y⃗) =
N
∑
j=1
(
−u
2n
N
y( j)1 +
u(k−κ)
N
y( j)2
)
−umx, (7)
where the “interaction” terms are
−u
2n
N
and
u(k−κ)
N
,
and the “field” term umx.
As mentioned by Campbell (2005), the interaction terms are divided by N so that demand
is based on the average production. Thus demand stays nonnegative for large N. For
example, if each Bank used all resources for oil spot market purchases (all y( j)1 = 1), then
p$(x,
−−−→
(1,0)) =−u2n−umx
is well-behaved and non-trivial (i.e., doesn’t go to negative infinity or zero). In a similar
manner, the gain from the oil spot market for each Bank agent would be
pO(x, y⃗) =
N
∑
j=1
(
un−ν
N
y( j)1 −
uδ
N
y( j)2
)
. (8)
From these gains, Bank i (1≤ i≤ N) has oil spot market payoff function
f (i)O = y
(i)
1 M pO, (9)
and dollar futures market payoff
f (i)$ = y
(i)
2 M p$. (10)
2 Bank agents are heterogeneous agents, since they can play different strategies.
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Adding these yields the payoff function for Bank i below:
f (i)(x, y⃗) = f (i)O + f
(i)
$ =
= y(i)1 M
N
∑
j=1
(
un−ν
N
y( j)1 −
uδ
N
y( j)2
)
+
+y(i)2 M
N
∑
j=1
(
−u
2n
N
y( j)1 +
u(k−κ)
N
y( j)2
)
−uMmxy(i)2
(11)
For brevity, we relabel the four interaction terms and field term as
E := M(un−ν)≥ 0, (12)
D := Muδ ≥ 0, (13)
K := Mu2n≥ 0, (14)
J := Mu(k−κ)≥ 0, (15)
hx := −uMmx≤ 0. (16)
1.3. Potential Games. A potential game (Monderer and Shapley 1996) with potential V (⃗q)
and payoff functions fi(⃗q), with
q⃗ = (q1, ...,qN),
for each agent i ∈ Λ satisfies, by definition,
∂
∂qi
fi(⃗q) =
∂
∂qi
V (⃗q). (17)
The salient point is that, for each i, the gradient of the potential with respect to the variables
of agent i is the same as the gradient of the ith agent’s payoff (with respect the ith agent’s
variables). In a dynamical interpretation, agents would follow the gradient of their payoff
function for “myopic decisions” (agents look at the best local choice), and for potentials
with an interior maximum, this would lead to the Nash equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley
1996).
1.4. Potential analysis of the model. In the model presented here, each bank agent has
two variables:
(y(i)1 ,y
(i)
2 ).
The conditions in Eq. 17 above for a potential require the “externality symmetry” condition
D = K, i.e., uδ = u2n
which is to say the negative correlation of the US dollar and oil markets must have the same
effect on each other (accounting for u) for there to be a potential. If this is the case, then the
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potential for the payoff functions in Eq. 11 is:
V (hx, y⃗) =
N
∑
i, j=1
E
2N
y(i)1 y
( j)
1 +
N
∑
i, j=1
J
2N
y(i)2 y
( j)
2 −
K
N
N
∑
i, j=1
y(i)1 y
( j)
2 +
−K
N
N
∑
i=1
y(i)1 y
(i)
2 +
E
2N
N
∑
i=1
[
y(i)1
]2
+
J
2N
N
∑
i=1
[
y(i)2
]2
+
+hx
N
∑
i=1
y(i)2 (18)
For computations, it will be easier to change variables from y⃗ to v⃗ ∈ ΩΛ, where for the
agents i (1≤ i≤ N) in the set Λ,
v(i)1 =
(
y(i)2 + y
(i)
1
)
/2, v(i)2 =
(
y(i)2 − y(i)1
)
/2, (19)
v(i)α ∈ [−1/2,1/2] for α = 1,2, the rotated domain
F˜(i) := [−1/2,1/2]× [−1/2,1/2] (20)
is a square, and the rotated configuration space is
ΩΛ :=∏
i∈Λ
F˜(i) = [−1/2,1/2]2N . (21)
The potential is then
V (hx, v⃗) =
N
∑
i, j=1
I−
N
v(i)1 v
( j)
1 +
N
∑
i, j=1
I+
N
v(i)2 v
( j)
2 −
2I
N
N
∑
i, j=1
v(i)1 v
( j)
2 +
−2I
N
N
∑
i=1
v(i)1 v
(i)
2 +
I−
N
N
∑
i=1
[
v(i)1
]2
+
I+
N
N
∑
i=1
[
v(i)2
]2
+
+hx
N
∑
i=1
(
v(i)1 + v
(i)
2
)
(22)
where
I := (J−E)/2, (23)
I+ := (J+E)/2+K, (24)
I− := (J+E)/2−K. (25)
1.5. Parameter Analysis. The general possibilities for the parameters result from the
possibilities for J, E, and K in the definitions 23, 24, 25, and the parameter
∆ :=
I−I+− I2
I−
=
[(J+E)/2−K][(J+E)/2+K]− (J−E)2/4
(J+E)/2−K =
=
(
√
JE +K)(
√
JE−K)
(J+E)/2−K . (26)
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The following assumptions generalize those made about the model by Carfì and Musolino
(2014b):
Assumption I− < 0. (27)
Assumption
⏐⏐⏐⏐ II−
⏐⏐⏐⏐< 1. (28)
The first assumption (Eq. 27) is the same as in Carfì and Musolino (2014b), and the latter
assumption (Eq. 28) generalizes the I = 0 assumption in Carfì and Musolino (2014b) by
keeping I small relative to I−. The assumption I− < 0 implies K > 0, and because the
arithmetic mean is greater than or equal to the geometric mean we have
Consequence I+ > 0, ∆> 0, (29)
since √
JE−K ≤ (J+E)/2−K = I− < 0,
J ≥ 0, E ≥ 0, K > 0,
and thus √
JE +K > 0.
2. Nash Equilibrium
2.1. Existing results. We will now find the maximum(s) of the potential in Eq. 18. This is
the appropriate refinement of the Nash equilibrium that we consider here (see Carbonell-
Nicolau and McLean 2014). The potential is quadratic in the v(i)α , with
1≤ i≤ N, α = 1,2
and by continuity it will have a maximum on the domain ΩΛ, which may occur in the
interior or on the boundary depending on the parameters I, I+, and I−. To this end, the
second-degree part of the potential is an
2N×2N
quadratic form Q equal to half of the second-derivative matrix D2V (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N;1 ≤
α, α¯ ≤ 2),
Q =
1
2
[
∂ 2V
∂v(i)α ∂v
( j)
α¯
]
=
1
N
[
I−Q0 IQ0
IQ0 I+Q0
]
(30)
with
Q0 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 1 1 · · · 1
1 2 1 · · · 1
1 1
. . .
...
...
...
. . . 1
1 1 · · · 1 2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where
• the upper-left quadrant of the matrix contains the α = α¯ = 1 terms,
• the upper-right contains the α = 1, α¯ = 2 terms,
• the lower-left has α = 2, α¯ = 1 terms,
Atti Accad. Pelorit. Pericol. Cl. Sci. Fis. Mat. Nat., Vol. 96, No. S1, A1 (2018) [19 pages]
A1-8 D. CARFÌ AND M. CAMPBELL
• the lower-right has α = α¯ = 2 terms.
We will use the LDL∗ decomposition (L is an invertible, lower-triangular matrix with ones
on the diagonal, L∗ is the transpose of L, D is a diagonal matrix) of the symmetric quadratic
form Q of the potential V in Eq. 30 to facilitate finding the maximum of the potential V .
The matrix L is determined from Q using elementary row operations (EROs) as outlined
by Beightler and Wilde (1996). The first step is to reduce Q to upper triangular form using
EROs, and then to determine D and L, which is done in Appendix A of Carfì and Campbell
(2015).
Now that the quadratic form corresponding to the potential V has been diagonalized as
Q = LDL∗,
we need to find the maximum of V (⃗v) on its domain
ΩΛ = [−1/2,1/2]2N .
The potential can be written as inner products
V (⃗v) = ⟨⃗v, Q⃗v⟩+hx
⟨⃗
1, v⃗
⟩
=
= ⟨⃗v,LDL∗⃗v⟩+hx
⟨⃗
1,(L∗)−1L∗⃗v
⟩
=
= ⟨L∗⃗v,DL∗⃗v⟩+hx
⟨
L−1⃗1,L∗⃗v
⟩
, (31)
where
1⃗M := [1 1 · · · 1]∗, 1⃗ := 1⃗2N , (32)
are the column vectors with M rows and 2N rows, respectively, having all entries equal to
one. Using
v⃗ :=L∗⃗v, (33)
the matrix D can be written as a direct sum of its N×N negative definite and positive
definite submatrices
D = D−⊕D+, (34)
and the vector v⃗ can be decomposed into a direct sum over the subspaces corresponding to
the N-dimensional negative definite and positive definite submatrices of D as
v⃗ = v⃗−⊕ v⃗+. (35)
The same can be done for
M⃗ :=L−1⃗1 (36)
to get
M⃗ = M⃗−⊕ M⃗+. (37)
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This direct sum decomposition will split the inner products as
V (⃗v) = ⟨(D−⊕D+) (⃗v−⊕ v⃗+) ,⃗v−⊕ v⃗+⟩+hx
⟨
M⃗−⊕ M⃗+ ,⃗v−⊕ v⃗+
⟩
=
= ⟨D−⃗v− ,⃗v−⟩+hx
⟨
M⃗− ,⃗v−
⟩
+ ⟨D+⃗v+ ,⃗v+⟩+hx
⟨
M⃗+ ,⃗v+
⟩
=
= −
 |D−|1/2⃗v−− hx2 |D−|−1/2M⃗−
2+
+
 D1/2+ v⃗++ hx2 D−1/2+ M⃗+
2+
+
h2x
4
 |D−|−1/2M⃗−2− h2x4  D−1/2+ M⃗+2 ,
(38)
where the last line is a result of completing the square,
|D−| :=−D− ≥ 0 (39)
as a matrix, and the square root of a diagonal matrix with non-negative entries dii is the
matrix having diagonal entries
√
dii.
2.2. Nash Analysis: first case. We first find the Nash equilibrium for the case when
hx ̸= 0; when Air purchases some amount of oil futures. First, using the upper-diagonal
form for L∗ in Eq. (44) of Carfì and Campbell (2015), we decompose the matrix L∗ as
L∗ =
⎡⎣ L∗1 ( II−)L∗1
0 L∗1
⎤⎦ (40)
where L∗1 is the N×N submatrix of L∗ appearing in the upper-left quadrant of L∗ (L∗ can
be found explicitly in Eq. (44) of Carfì and Campbell (2015)). Then using the notation of
Eq. 38, we can use a direct sum to represent the vector
v⃗ ∈ΦΛ
as
v⃗ = v⃗t ⊕ v⃗b, (41)
where
v⃗t , v⃗b ∈ [−1/2,1/2]N .
Furthermore,
L∗⃗v =
(
L∗1⃗vt +
I
I−
L∗1⃗vb
)
⊕L∗1⃗vb = v⃗−⊕ v⃗+, (42)
DL∗⃗v = D−
(
L∗1⃗vt +
I
I−
L∗1⃗vb
)
⊕D+L∗1⃗vb = D−⃗v−⊕D+⃗v+. (43)
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From Eq. 38, we define the restricted potential
V v⃗t0 (⃗vb) :=
⟨
D−
(
L∗1⃗vt0 +
I
I−
L∗1⃗vb
)
, L∗1⃗vt0 +
I
I−
L∗1⃗vb
⟩
+ ⟨D+L∗1⃗vb , L∗1⃗vb⟩+
+
⟨
hxProj−L
−1⃗1 , L∗1⃗vt0 +
I
I−
L∗1⃗vb
⟩
+
⟨
hxProj+L
−1⃗1 , L∗1⃗vb
⟩
.
(44)
The expression in Eq. 44 can be simplified by decomposing L−1 as
L−1 =
⎡⎣ L−11 0(
I
I−
)
L−11 L
−1
1
⎤⎦ , (45)
where L−11 is the N×N submatrix of L−1 appearing in the upper-left quadrant of L−1 (the
transpose of L−1 is seen explicitly in equation (55) of Carfì and Campbell (2015)). Some
calculation shows
Proj−L
−1⃗12N = L−11 1⃗N , (46)
Proj+L
−1⃗12N =
(
1− I
I−
)
L−11 1⃗N . (47)
We verify convexity of V v⃗t0 in
v⃗b ∈ [−1/2,1/2]N
by substituting Eqs. 46, 47, expanding, and rearranging Eq. 44:
V v⃗t0 (⃗vb) :=
⟨(
D++
I2
I2−
D−
)
L∗1⃗vb , L
∗
1⃗vb
⟩
+
⟨
D−L∗1⃗vt0 , L
∗
1⃗vt0
⟩
+
+2
⟨
D−L∗1⃗vt0 ,
I
I−
L∗1⃗vb
⟩
+
⟨
hxL
−1
1 1⃗N , L
∗
1⃗vt0 +
I
I−
L∗1⃗vb
⟩
+
+
⟨
hx
(
1− I
I−
)
L−11 1⃗N , L
∗
1⃗vb
⟩
, (48)
which is convex if
D++
I2
I2−
D− ≥ 0. (49)
To see this, define
D0 :=diag [2/1, . . . ,(k+1)/k, . . . ,(N+1)/N] . (50)
From the decomposition for D in (45) of Appendix A of Carfì and Campbell (2015), it is
seen that
D− =
I−
N
D0, (51)
D+ =
∆
N
D0, (52)
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and that
D++
I2
I2−
D− =
1
N
(
∆+
I2
I−
)
D0 =
=
I+
N
D0 > 0 (53)
since I+ > 0 from Eq. 24 which, along with D0 > 0, implies that V v⃗t0 is convex in v⃗b.
Consequently, its maximum must occur at one or more extreme points of the domain for
any such fixed v⃗t0 . It is then evident that any point at which a maximum of the potential V
occurs must be of the form
v⃗∧ = v⃗t ⊕ v⃗e, (54)
where
v⃗t ∈ [−1/2,1/2]N
and v⃗e is an extreme point which we write as
v⃗e =
1
2
[(−1)p1 (−1)p1 · · ·(−1)pN ]∗ , (55)
with pi = 0 or pi = 1 for 1≤ i≤ N.
The norm-form of the potential in Eq. 38 can be written
V (⃗vt0 ⊕ v⃗e) = −
 |D−|1/2(L∗1⃗vt0 + II− L∗1⃗ve
)
− hx
2
|D−|−1/2L−11 1⃗N
2+
+
 D1/2+ L∗1⃗ve+ hx2 D−1/2+
(
1− I
I−
)
L−1⃗1N
2+
+
h2x
4
 |D−|−1/2L−11 1⃗N2+
−h
2
x
4
 D−1/2+ (1− II−
)
L−1⃗1N
2 . (56)
Since the maximum of the restricted potential in Eq. 44 occurs at an extreme point for each
v⃗t0 , finding the maximum of the potential in Eq. 56 amounts to (1) minimizing the first
negative norm term of V in v⃗t0 (Eq. 56) for an arbitrary extreme
v⃗b = v⃗e
and then (2) finding the extreme point v⃗e that maximizes V as shown below. The negative
norm term in Eq. 56 is minimized when the term
|D−|1/2L∗1⃗vt0
in the first norm is antiparallel to the other terms, which amounts to
v⃗t0 =−ω
(
I
I−
v⃗e− hx2 |D−|
−1/2L−11 1⃗N
)
, 0≤ ω ≤ 1 (57)
and ω is the greatest number so that v⃗t is still in its domain
[−1/2,1/2]N .
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Multiplying out the matrices in Eq. 57 results in
v⃗ω := v⃗t0 =−ω
(
I
I−
v⃗e+
hx
2I−
N
N+1
1⃗N
)
. (58)
Using Eqs. 41, 42, 43, 51, and 52, we can substitite the expression in Eq. 58 into Eq. 31
along with the extreme point v⃗b = v⃗e to obtain
V (⃗vω ⊕ v⃗e) =
⟨
∆I−+(1−ω)2I2
NI−
Q0⃗ve , v⃗e
⟩
+
+
⟨
v⃗e , hx
[
I
I−
{(ω−1)2−1}+1
]
1⃗N
⟩
+
+
hx
2
4I−
N2
N+1
(ω2−2ω) (59)
where
Q0 := L1D0L∗1
is the N×N matrix
Q0 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 1 1 · · · 1
1 2 1 · · · 1
1 1
. . .
...
...
...
. . . 1
1 1 · · · 1 2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (60)
and we used the result
Q0⃗1N = (N+1)⃗1N .
The scalar in the first inner product of Eq. 59 is positive. This is evident since
I− < 0, I+ > 0,
and
(ω−1)2−1≤ 0
imply
∆I−+(1−ω)2I2 = I−I++[(1−ω)2−1]I2 < 0. (61)
Using this, the fact that Q0 has all positive entries, and the representation for v⃗e in Eq. 55,
the first inner product in Eq. 59 can be written
N
∑
i, j=1
gi j
(−1)pi
2
(−1)p j
2
, (62)
where
gi j > 0
and
pi ∈ {0,1}
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for all 1≤ i, j≤ N. It is then clear that the maximum of the first inner product in Eq. 59 will
occur when all of the pi are equal to each other, which happens in Eq. 55 for the domain
points
v⃗±e =±
1
2
1⃗N . (63)
To determine which of the two points in Eq. 63 gives the maximum for the potential, we
need to look at the second inner product of the potential in Eq. 59. The assumption in Eq. 28
along with the fact that
−1≤ (ω−1)2−1≤ 0
implies that the vector in the second inner product of Eq. 59 has direction completely
determined by hx. This can be seen in the case
I/I− < 0
by observing that this implies
I
I−
[(ω−1)2−1]+1 > 0. (64)
Likewise, when
I/I− > 0,
we see
I
I−
[(ω−1)2−1]+1 > (1)[−1]+1 = 0, (65)
since we assume
I/I− < 1
from Eq. 28 in this case. In both cases, Eq. 28 implies that the coefficient of the vector 1⃗N
in Eq. 59 satisfies
sign
(
hx
[
I
I−
{(ω−1)2−1}+1
])
= sign(hx) =−1 (66)
from the condition for hx in Eq. 12, with
sign(x) := x/|x| for x ̸= 0.
From this it is seen that the second inner product in Eq. 59 is maximized by the extreme
point
v⃗−e =−
1
2
1⃗N , (67)
which also maximizes the first inner product of Eq. 59. Finally, we need to determine the
most maximum value for ω so that v⃗ω is in the domain
[−1/2,1/2]N .
Using Eq. 67 in Eq. 58 yields
v⃗ω =
1
2
ω
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
1⃗N ∈ [−1/2,1/2]N . (68)
This imposes the following conditions on ω ∈ [0,1]:
− 1
2
≤ 1
2
ω
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
≤ 1
2
. (69)
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From Eq. 57, we want to choose the most maximum value of
ω ∈ [0,1]
subject to Eq. 69. This results in
ω = min
(
1,
(N+1)|I−|
|(N+1)I−Nhx|
)
. (70)
Substituting Eq. 70 into Eq. 68 , we see that the maximum of the potential V , over its
domain ΩΛ occurs at the Nash equilibrium v⃗∧, where
(v∧)(k)1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ (N+1)I−Nhx(N+1)I−
⏐⏐⏐⏐≤ 1,
1
2
sign
(
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
)
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ (N+1)I−Nhx(N+1)I−
⏐⏐⏐⏐> 1,
(71)
(v∧)(k)2 =
1
2
sign(hx) =−
1
2
, (72)
for 1≤ k ≤ N,
are the respective entries for the first N and last N of coordinates of v⃗∧ and
sign(x) = x/|x| for x ̸= 0.
We want the Nash equilibrium coordinates in Eqs. 71 and 72 in terms of the original
coordinates y⃗ in 3.
Converting back to the original “diamond” coordinates in Eq. 19, we then see that the
original coordinates of the single (refined) Nash equilibrium y⃗∧ when Air purchases
oil futures (hx < 0) are
(y∧)(k)1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
+
1
2
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ (N+1)I−Nhx(N+1)I−
⏐⏐⏐⏐≤ 1,
1
2
sign
(
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
)
+
1
2
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ (N+1)I−Nhx(N+1)I−
⏐⏐⏐⏐> 1,
(73)
(y∧)(k)2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
− 1
2
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ (N+1)I−Nhx(N+1)I−
⏐⏐⏐⏐≤ 1,
1
2
sign
(
(N+1)I−Nhx
(N+1)I−
)
− 1
2
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ (N+1)I−Nhx(N+1)I−
⏐⏐⏐⏐> 1,
(74)
for 1≤ k ≤ N,
as the (original) coordinates of the Nash equilibrium, which is where the maximum of the
potential occurs.
2.3. Nash Analysis: zero-field case. Now we analyze the degenerate “zero-field” case
hx = 0; when Air makes no purchase of oil futures. The analysis is the same as the above
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hx < 0 case up to Eq. 57. When hx = 0, Eq. 57 becomes
v⃗t0 =−ω
I
I−
v⃗e 0≤ ω ≤ 1, (75)
where ω is the greatest number so that v⃗t is still in its domain
[−1/2,1/2]N
as in Eq. 70:
ω = min
(
1,
|I−|
|I|
)
. (76)
Furthermore, the potential in Eq. 59 only consists of the first inner product, and the result in
Eq. 63 still holds: the two points that maximize the potential are
v⃗±e =±
1
2
1⃗N . (77)
Putting together Eqs. 75, 76, and 77, we see the potential has the two maximum points
v⃗∧± =−ω
I
I−
v⃗e⊕ v⃗e
given by
(v∧±)
(k)
1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
±1
2
(−I
I−
)
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ II−
⏐⏐⏐⏐≤ 1,
±1
2
sign
(−I
I−
)
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ II−
⏐⏐⏐⏐> 1,
(78)
(v∧±)
(k)
2 = ±
1
2
, (79)
for 1≤ k ≤ N.
The original coordinates of the of the two (refined) Nash equilibriums y⃗∧± when Air
purchases no oil futures (i.e., zero-field case hx = 0) are then
(y∧±)
(k)
1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
±1
2
(−I
I−
−1
)
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ II−
⏐⏐⏐⏐≤ 1,
±1
2
(
sign
(−I
I−
)
−1
)
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ II−
⏐⏐⏐⏐> 1,
(80)
(y∧±)
(k)
2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
±1
2
(−I
I−
+1
)
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ II−
⏐⏐⏐⏐≤ 1,
±1
2
(
sign
(−I
I−
)
+1
)
if
⏐⏐⏐⏐ II−
⏐⏐⏐⏐> 1,
(81)
for 1≤ k ≤ N.
In general, the type of maximums of the potential depend on Q, the quadratic part of the
potential, which is affected by the various cases of the parameters. There are three major
Atti Accad. Pelorit. Pericol. Cl. Sci. Fis. Mat. Nat., Vol. 96, No. S1, A1 (2018) [19 pages]
A1-16 D. CARFÌ AND M. CAMPBELL
cases involving the parameters that characterize the quadratic form Q. Table 1 summarizes
this, and we point out that the sub-cases are not exhaustive.
TABLE 1. Quadratic Form Parameter Cases
Case Sub-Case Quadratic Form
I. K ≥ J+E2 ≥
√
JE (a) K = J+E2 ; I− = 0,∆ undefined degenerate
(b) K > J+E2 ; I− < 0,∆> 0 neg-def⊕pos-def
II. J+E2 ≥ K ≥
√
JE I− > 0,∆< 0, pos-def⊕neg-def
III. J+E2 ≥
√
JE ≥ K (a) J+E2 ≥
√
JE > K; I− > 0,∆> 0 positive definite
(b) J+E2 >
√
JE = K; I− > 0,∆= 0 degenerate
In this paper, we only consider a generalization of the model set up by Carfì and Musolino
(2014b), which is case I(b) in Table 1, along with the condition |I/I−|< 1 in Eq. 28.
3. Conclusions
We have found the maximum(s) of the potential for this model, which is the (refined)
Nash equilibrium(s). These equilibriums have some of the same characteristics as those for
the Nash equilibrium discussed by Carfì and Musolino (2014b).
We have seen that when the real economic subject “Air” does not purchase oil futures,
the field term hx is equal to zero, and there are two Nash equilibriums due to a symmetry in
the quadratic potential. This maximum of the potential occurs at two extreme points on the
domain. When Air purchases oil futures, the field term hx different from zero, affects all
“Bank” investment players in such a way that there is one Nash equilibrium. Air’s purchase
adds a linear term to the potential which breaks the zero-field symmetry, and consequently
the absolute maximum of the potential only occurs at a single point.
The existence of multiple equilibriums in this interdependent two-market system is not
surprising, in light of the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem. Another point of view is
that the occurrence of symmetry-breaking under certain conditions, which is associated with
more than one Nash equilibrium, is also consequence of a phase transition in certain bounded
rational economic models. These phase transitions characterize very different behaviors of
agents above and below a “critical temperature”, or degree of bounded rationality (Campbell
2005). The symmetry breaking in this model for N Banks, along with the persistence of
two equilibria, as N tends to infinity, is motivation to investigate the existence of a phase
transition for a statistically large number of Banks. This will be done in a subsequent work.
In Memoriam
The authors wish to dedicate —with humility and great respect— this little work to our
friend and esteemed colleague Prof. Gaetano Giaquinta, a person who has truly enriched,
substantially, the world of science, of research, of thought and its dissemination. A true
scientist, standing in the eld until the last moment of his life. A tireless researcher, a scholar
of those who aim at the discovery of the profound truths of nature and of the human soul,
beyond any fashion and any academic need: a man of thought and of great consistency and
honesty, as few remain today.
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